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Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action
have considerably enlarged our understanding of
human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of
the mirror system, first discovered in the brain of non-
human primates, provides an observer with the under-
standing of a perceived action by means of the motor
simulation of the agent’s observed movements. This
discovery has raised the prospects of a motor theory of
social cognition. In humans, social cognition includes
the ability to mindread, and many motor theorists of
social cognition try to bridge the gap between motor
cognition and mindreading by endorsing a simulation
account of mindreading. Here, we question the motor
theory of social cognition and give reasons for our
skepticism.
Introduction
Motor theories of human cognition are ubiquitous. Our
topic is the motor theory of social cognition. The remark-
able discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ (MNs) in the
ventral pre-motor cortex (area F5) of macaque monkeys
[1–3] and the discovery of the mirror system in humans
[4–7] have raised the prospects of a ‘motor theory of social
cognition’, whose goal is to derive human social cognition
from human motor cognition [8–12]. MNs are sensori-
motor neurons that fire both when a monkey executes
certain kinds of actions and when the monkey perceives
the same actions being performed by another [1–3]. By
automatically matching the agent’s observed movements
onto her own motor repertoire without executing them,
the firing of MNs in the observer’s brain simulates the
agent’s observed movements and thereby contributes to
the understanding of the perceived action [1–3]. Thus,
MNs supply motor, not purely perceptual, representations
of actions. Because they are located in the pre-motor
cortex, MNs should not fire in an observer’s brain unless
the represented action was executable, that is, consistent
with the rules of the motor system [13–14]. We therefore
think that one important function of MNs might be to
enhance learning technical skills by allowing motor
imitation [2,15] (but see Box 1). However, we are skeptical
about the view that MNs constitute the fundamental
neural basis of human social cognition. In this article, we
explain why.
Human social cognition and mindreading
In a weak sense, human social cognition encompasses all
cognitive processes relevant to the perception and under-
standing of conspecifics [16]. So it includes, but it is not
restricted to, the cognitive processes involved in the
understanding of perceived actions performed by con-
specifics. It is widely recognized that what is distinctive of
human social cognition is the human mindreading ability
to understand, not just the observable behavior of one’s
conspecifics, but also one’s own mind (which we shall
ignore here) and especially the minds of others [17–20].
Thanks to their mindreading ability, healthy human
adults readily explain and predict human actions by
representing and attributing to human agents a whole
battery of internal unobservable mental states such as
goals, intentions, emotions, perceptions, desires, beliefs,
many of which are far removed from any observable
behavior [21]. It is also intuitively clear that there is a gap
between full-blown human mindreading and the psycho-
logical understanding of perceived actions afforded by
MNs. Thus, the challenge faced bymotor theorists of social
cognition is to bridge this gap.
Faced with this challenge, the strategy favored by
motor theorists of social cognition is to tinker with the
concept of motor simulation, as suggested by simulation
theorists of mindreading [8,10–12,22–23]. We disapprove
this strategy because it relaxes the fundamental link
between simulation and the requirements of the motor
system, which we take very seriously. The firing of MNs is
a social cognitive process only in a very weak sense. When
MNs fire in the brain of a monkey during action execution,
the discharge is not a social cognitive process at all. When
MNs fire in the brain of a monkey watching another grasp
a fruit, the discharge is a weakly social process: the two
monkeys are not involved in any kind of non-verbal
intentional communication. The agent intends to grasp a
fruit, not to impart some information to his conspecific.
Nor does the observer’s understanding of the action
require him to understand the agent’s communicative
intention (because the agent has none).
One way to question themotor theory of social cognition
would be to challenge it to account for the human capacity
to read one’s ownmind or to ascribe false beliefs to others –
something that healthy human adults do all the time
without effort. But this is not what we shall do. Instead,
we shall grant that simulating an agent’s movements
might be sufficient for understanding his motor intention,
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but we shall argue that it is not sufficient for under-
standing the agent’s prior intention, his social intention
and his communicative intention. Then, we shall argue
that motor simulation may not even be necessary for
understanding all perceived actions. Finally, we shall
argue that a significant part of human social cognition
consists of a ‘perceptual social’ system whose neural basis
has perceptual but no motor properties [15,24].
Motor simulation, motor intentions and prior intentions
Evidence from brain imaging in healthy adults and
autistic individuals suggests that reasoning about beliefs
and representing goals and intentions are subserved by
different brain areas [19,20]. Evidence from develop-
mental psychology suggests that the former is a later
and more costly accomplishment than the latter [17,18,25].
An action is a goal-directed sequence of bodily movements
initiated and monitored by what we shall call a ‘motor
intention’. Understanding a perceived action requires at
least representing the agent’s motor intention. Although
human adults readily explain actions by representing
agents’ (true or false) beliefs, it is possible, by relying on
one’s own current perception of the world, to represent the
goal of a perceived action or the agent’s motor intention
without representing an agent’s (true) beliefs. By simu-
lating the agent’s perceived movements, the observer can
represent the agent’s motor intention.
Indeed, before they can reason about beliefs, young
children can represent goals and intentions [19,20]. After
having been habituated to seeing a reach-and-grasp hand
movement, five- to eight month-old infants look longer
when the target of the prehension movement changes
than when the path of the hand movement changes [26].
However, when grasping by a human hand is replaced by
the motion of an artefact – for example, a metal claw – the
pattern of preference elicited by seeing the movement of
the human hand disappears [26]. This is compatible with
the hypothesis that infants represent the goal of the action
and the agent’s motor intention by matching the observed
hand movement onto their own motor repertoire – that is,
by motor simulation.
Philosophers, however, have long emphasized the
distinction between basic actions and non-basic actions:
for example, the non-basic action of turning on the light
can be performed by the basic action of pressing a switch.
They also make the correlative distinction between motor
intentions (or ‘intentions in action’) and ‘prior’ intentions
whose goals are more remote [27,28]. A motor intention is
an intention to execute a basic action. Given one’s prior
intention to execute the non-basic action of turning on the
light, one forms the motor intention to perform the basic
action of, for example, pressing the switch with one’s right
index finger. Perceiving the basic action of pressing the
switch with the right index finger automatically causes
the observer to entertain the very motor representation
that guides the agent’s execution of the action. By
executing the basic action, the agent also performs the
non-basic action of turning on the light. The agent’s basic
action is controlled by his motor intention. His non-basic
action is controlled by his prior intention. We surmise that
by simulating the agent’s perceived movement of pressing
the switch with his right index finger, an observer will
understand the agent’s motor intention to execute the
basic action, not his prior intention to execute the non-
basic action.
Motor simulation and understanding social intentions
Not all human actions are directed towards inanimate
targets. Some are directed towards conspecifics. In
addition to the distinction between motor intentions and
prior intentions, an agent’s non-social intentions must be
distinguished from his social intentions, that is, his
intentions to act on conspecifics, who, unlike inanimate
targets of action, can act back. Thus, a social intention is
an intention to affect a conspecific’s behavior. Because
humans often act out of their mental representations, a
social intention can also be an intention to modify a
conspecific’s mental representations. The question is:
could an observer represent an agent’s social intention
by simulating the agent’s observed movements? As the
following thought-experiment will show, it is unlikely that
what enables an observer to represent an agent’s social
Box 1. Mental simulation: a hybrid concept
Mental simulation, of which motor simulation is an instance, is a
hybrid concept: it involves at least two separable ingredients. One idea
is that a cognitive mechanism can be used ‘off-line’. For example, it
has been suggested [45] that in visual imagery, the human visual
system is used off-line: instead of taking retinal inputs, it receives
inputs from memory. Instead of producing a visual percept, it
produces a mental visual image. Thus, visual imagery consists in
simulating visual perception or, as Gallese and Goldman [12] put it, ‘in
pretending to see’ (p. 497).
The other idea is that mental simulation is the cognitive basis of
imitation. A natural assumption is that the firing of MNs is the neural
basis of motor imitation. MNs have been discovered in the brain of
macaque monkeys. Do they imitate? Until recently, the evidence
seemed negative [46]. But there is intriguing new positive evidence
[47]. Interestingly, motor theorists of social cognition have taken two
different, if not irreconcilable, positions on imitation. On the one hand,
Gallese and Goldman [12] have strongly denied that a function of MNs
is ‘to promote learning by imitation’ (p. 495–6). On the other hand, on
behalf of the simulation theory (ST) of mindreading, they have
stressed the importance of imitation in tasks of third-person mind-
reading: ‘ST depicts mindreading as incorporating an attempt to
replicate, mimic, or impersonate the mental life of the target agent’
(p. 497).
The main problem with imitation is that it is a folk psychological
concept whose boundaries are presently too ill-defined for scientific
purposes. Newborn babies, who reproduce facial movements of lip
and tongue protrusion, are said to imitate [48]. And so are 18-month-
old toddlers, who have been shown to be able to produce a correct
version of an action of which they have observed an aborted version
[49]. Does imitation reduce to copying? Or does imitation allow
creative interpretation? Unless this ambiguity is resolved, it is hard to
evaluate Meltzoff and Decety’s claim that ‘motor imitation’ is ‘the
missing link’ between MNs and ‘theory of mind’ [50]. If imitation
requires copying, then, unlike observable behavior, beliefs cannot be
imitated for they cannot be copied. If imitation is not restricted to
copying and if creative interpretation is allowed as part of imitation,
then perhaps even beliefs could be imitated. But one cannot have it
both ways.
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intention is the observer’s ability to match an agent’s
perceived movements onto his or her own motor
repertoire.
Consider Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. The former is a
renowned surgeon who performs appendectomies on his
anesthestized patients. The latter is a dangerous sadist
whoperformsexactly the samehandmovements onhis non-
anesthestized victims. As it turns out,MrHyde is Dr Jekyll.
Suppose that Dr Watson witnesses both Dr Jekyll’s and
Mr Hyde’s actions. Upon perceiving Dr Jekyll, alias
Mr Hyde, execute the same motor sequence twice,
whereby he grasps his scalpel and applies it to the same
bodily part of two different persons, presumably the very
same MNs produce the same discharge in Dr Watson’s
brain. Dr Jekyll’s motor intention is the same as
Mr Hyde’s. However, Dr Jekyll’s social intention clearly
differs from Mr Hyde’s: whereas Dr Jekyll intends to
improve his patient’s medical condition, Mr Hyde intends
to derive pleasure from his victim’s agony. By matching
them onto his ownmotor repertoire, an observer simulates
the agent’s movements. Simulating the agent’s move-
ments might allow an observer to represent the agent’s
motor intention. We surmise that it will not allow him to
represent the agent’s social intention.
Motor simulation and understanding communicative
intentions
MNs were first discovered in the context of motor and
perceptual tasks that had a very weak social content, if
any. As recognized by philosophers, psychologists and
linguists studying pragmatics, especially complex among
a human agent’s social intentions are his (reflexive or self-
referential) communicative intentions. A communicative
intention is an intention to impart information by virtue of
its own recognition by the addressee [29,30]. Jill might
have the social intention to cause Bill to believe that his
wife is unfaithful to him without Bill’s recognizing Jill’s
social intention. If so, then Jill’s social intention is not a
communicative intention. But Jill cannot have the com-
municative intention to cause Bill to acquire the same
belief without Bill’s recognizing Jill’s communicative
intention.
Now, consider Jill’s non-verbal communicative inten-
tion whereby she intends to convey to John her desire to
leave the party by ostensively pointing her index finger
onto her wrist-watch in front of John. John thereby
acquires the belief that Jill wants to leave the party by
recognizing her communicative intention. Jill might,
however, execute the very same ostensive bodily move-
ment if she wants John to believe instead that her watch is
inaccurate. Simulating Jill’s movement of her right index
finger towards her left wrist will allow John to represent
Jill’s motor intention. But it will not allow him to
distinguish between Jill’s two communicative intentions.
Why motor simulation might not be necessary for
understanding all perceived actions
Simulating an agent’s observed movements is not suffi-
cient for representing either an agent’s prior intention or
his social intention. Is it necessary? Evidence from
developmental psychology suggests that it is not: upon
perceiving the relative motions of geometrical stimuli,
6-month-old infants automatically ascribe goals to them
[31,32]. The question is: why do they ascribe goals to
moving geometrical stimuli, and not to a metal claw
moving towards a standing inanimate target [26]?
It has long been known that perceiving the relative
motions of geometrical stimuli with no human or animal
aspect (e.g. circles and triangles) can prompt normal
adults to ascribe emotions and social intentions to the
moving stimuli, which they describe using intentional
verbs such ‘chase’, ‘corner’, ‘attack’, ‘caress’ or ‘comfort’
[33,34]. There is also evidence that 3–4-year-old toddlers
respond like adults to the perception of Heider and
Simmel type of stimuli [35]. Recently, when showed a
triangle and a square whose motions were automatically
seen respectively as ‘helping’ and as ‘hindering’ a circle
move up a slope, 12-month-old infants exhibited a clear
preference for the former over the latter [36].
Seeing the biological movement of a human hand reach
and grasp a target prompts a human observer to represent
the agent’s motor intention by automatically matching the
perceived movement onto her own motor repertoire [26].
Given the asymmetry between a moving human hand and
its inanimate target, perceiving the action elicits the
attribution of a motor intention, not of a social intention,
to the agent. By contrast, geometrical stimuli form a
homogeneous class of entities. Seeing geometrical stimuli
move in relation to one another causes in humans a
‘perceptual social illusion’, that is, an illusion of social
interactions guided by social intentions [33–36]. But given
that the motion of geometrical stimuli is non-biological, it
follows that the process whereby social intentions are
represented and ascribed cannot be by matching the
observed motions onto one’s own motor repertoire, that is,
by simulation in the narrow sense. Clearly, the process
whereby geometrical stimuli are ascribed social intentions
cannot be motor simulation.
Many social interactions are actions at a distance that
involve an agent’s head- and eye-movements towards or
away from, but no direct bodily contact with, a conspecific.
On the one hand, by the age of 7 months, human infants
expect human interactions, unlike causal relations
between inanimate objects, not to involve bodily contact
[37]. On the other hand, much evidence from single cell
recordings in the brain of macaque monkeys and from
brain imaging in human adults suggests the existence of
a purely perceptual system of ‘social perception’ [15,24]
that can be tricked by perceptual illusions (the hallmark
of perceptual systems). It involves the cooperation
between at least three brain areas: the Superior Temporal
Sulcus (STS), the amygdala and the orbito-frontal cortex
[15,19,24,34,38–41]. Unlike neurons in F5 and in the
inferior parietal lobule, which fire in response to the
perception of object-oriented actions, many neurons in
STS respond to the perception of others’ actions directed
towards conspecifics: they lackmotor properties [2,42] and
they do not respond to the perception of one’s own
movements [43,44].
There is a good reason why the perceptual response
to a perceived action directed towards a conspecific
would lack motor properties. The inanimate target of an
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object-oriented action does not act. As a result, the only
movements which an observer can automatically match
onto his own motor repertoire are the agent’s. If, however,
the target of a perceived action is a conspecific, then he or
she will react. But then, the observer will simply be unable
to automatically and simultaneously match onto his own
motor repertoire the perceived movements of both agents.
Only if he intentionally neglects one of the agent’s
observed movements will the observer be able to simulate
the other’s movements. This might be a case of motor
simulation, but it is an intentional, not an automatic,
process.
Conclusion
The mirror system is the mechanism whereby an observer
understands a perceived action by simulating, without
executing, the agent’s observed movements. The motor
properties of the mirror system are well designed for
representing an agent’s motor intention involved in an
object-oriented action, not for representing an agent’s
social intention, let alone his communicative intention.
The mirror system does not seem well designed for
promoting fast responses to the perception of social actions
directed towards conspecifics. For example, in response to
the perception of a threat, it might be adaptive to flee, not
to simulate the threatening agent’s observed movements.
Evidence from single cell recordings in the monkey STS
shows that observing many actions towards conspecifics
prompts purely perceptual responses without motor
properties. Important for future research are questions
relevant to the assessment of the scope of the primate
system for pure ‘social perception’: for example, would a
male monkey respond to the perception of a female’s
behavioral response to his own courting behavior by
matching her observed movements? We predict that it
would not.
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